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This paper addresses whether credit rating downgrades feed back on the asset value of the 
downgraded companies, causing real losses. To investigate this issue we construct a structural 
credit risk model incorporating ratings and the feedback loss. To estimate the parameters of 
the model we develop a maximum likelihood estimator using time series of equity prices and 
credit ratings. Implementing the model on a sample of US public firms downgraded from 
investment grade to junk, we find strong support for the existence of feedback losses. First, 
estimated feedback losses are significant for a third of our sample with the cross-sectional 
averages of the feedback loss around 7 %. Second, the behavior of estimated asset volatilities 
around downgrades in real data is consistent with the predictions of our model. We observe a 
hump-shaped pattern of estimated asset volatilities when feedback is ignored. Using the 
feedback model, the hump-shaped pattern disappears. These findings suggest that ignoring 
feedback can lead to the appearance of changing asset volatility even when the real volatility 
is constant. Last, accounting for feedback helps in asset volatility prediction. 
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This paper addresses whether credit rating downgrades feed back on the
asset value of the downgraded companies, causing real losses. To investigate
this issue we construct a structural credit risk model incorporating ratings
and the feedback loss. To estimate the parameters of the model we develop
a maximum likelihood estimator using time series of equity prices and credit
ratings. Implementing the model on a sample of US public ﬁrms downgraded
from investment grade to junk, we ﬁnd strong support for the existence of
feedback losses. First, estimated feedback losses are signiﬁcant for a third of
our sample with the cross-sectional averages of the feedback loss around 7 %.
Second, the behavior of estimated asset volatilities around downgrades in real
data is consistent with the predictions of our model. We observe a hump-shaped
pattern of estimated asset volatilities when feedback is ignored. Using the
feedback model, the hump-shaped pattern disappears. These ﬁndings suggest
that ignoring feedback can lead to the appearance of changing asset volatility
even when the real volatility is constant. Last, accounting for feedback helps
in asset volatility prediction.
Keywords: Credit ratings, distress costs, maximum likelihood, option pricing,
credit risk.
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11 Introduction
Credit ratings apparently play an important role in modern ﬁnancial markets. Also,
corporate executives seem to keep their eyes on credit ratings. As an example, in
their survey of CFO’s, Graham and Harvey (1993) ﬁnd that credit ratings come out
as the second most important factor in deciding the level of debt. But what exactly is
the economic rationale behind this focus? Are ratings simply an easy-to-understand
summary measure of creditworthiness without any economic consequences? Or do
rating changes themselves impose real costs on the companies in terms of higher
costs of ﬁnancing, forcing ﬁre sales of assets or reducing access to credit?
In this paper we try to shed light on these questions by using the behavior of eq-
uity volatility around downgrades. To provide a causal link between equity volatility
and feedback losses we include ratings and the feedback eﬀect in a structural credit
risk model. Our model predicts that the existence of losses due to downgrades acts
as an extra source of uncertainty in the period before the downgrades. Then, we go
to real equity and ratings data and use this pattern to estimate the feedback eﬀects.
The main insight of the paper is that feedback losses can be thought of as a short
position in a barrier option with a payoﬀ triggered by the rating downgrade. Thus,
one can think of the equity as a portfolio of a European call (no feedback losses) and
the short position in the barrier option. This implies that if downgrade probabilities
are somewhat predictable (tied to asset values), feedback losses make the equity of
a company approaching downgrade riskier than the standard leverage eﬀect would
suggest. To see why this is the case, consider the example of an investment grade
company close to being downgraded to speculative grade. Each fundamental nega-
tive (positive) shock to the asset value of the company has the secondary eﬀect of
increasing (decreasing) the probability that the company is downgraded. If down-
grades lead to losses, this translates to a further downward (upward) push on equity
prices. This eﬀect gets stronger as the company gets closer to downgrade and disap-
pears after downgrade, as the uncertainty about the rating change is resolved. This
paper essentially uses this equity volatility pattern around downgrades to ascertain
whether observed equity data indicates the presence of feedback losses.
We use the logic outlined above on two levels. First, we construct a structural
credit risk model incorporating credit ratings and the feedback from ratings to asset
values. Our framework is in the tradition of Merton (1974) where equity is modelled
as an option on the ﬁrm value. The model is set in discrete time and the ﬁrm
continues until some future time T, when it is liquidated and the proceeds are
divided between equityholders and bondholders. As in Merton (1974), the ﬁrm has
zero-coupon debt outstanding, maturing at T. We add credit ratings to the model
by postulating a rating assignment mechanism where a ﬁrm gets downgraded as
its fundamental value falls below some point. In our rating assignment model we
allow both for the fact that rating agencies base their decisions on longer-horizon
averages of the ﬁnancial performance of ﬁrms and for some noise surrounding the
2assignment process. Crucially, in this model, rating changes can feed back on the
fundamental value in the form of a proportional loss. Thus ratings can have real
eﬀects in addition to being summary statistics of the ﬁrms’ creditworthiness.1 When
feedback is switched oﬀ, our model reduces to Merton’s model. We also need a way
to estimate the parameters of the model based on equity and ratings data for a given
ﬁrm. To derive a maximum likelihood (ML) estimator for the model we adopt the
transformed data approach of Duan (1994).2 Implementing the ML estimation of
the model using a sample of 168 downgraded US public ﬁrms, real equity and ratings
data are found to be consistent with our theory. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant feedback eﬀects
for a third of our sample which is much more than chance would suggest. The mean
feedback loss in the whole sample is around 7 % of the fundamental value.
Second, we try to conduct more robust tests of feedback losses, less dependent on
the speciﬁc model. In particular, the discussion before suggests that if one ignores
the feedback eﬀect, asset volatility estimates will likely increase before downgrades
and decrease afterwards. For this, we use the canonical model of Merton (1974)
without the feedback eﬀect to estimate asset volatilities. In line with the presence
of feedback losses, we indeed ﬁnd a signiﬁcant hump-shaped asset volatility pattern
around downgrades when we use Merton’s model. However, there is no such pat-
tern when the feedback eﬀect is incorporated. In addition, we investigate whether
allowing for feedback helps asset volatility prediction out-of-sample. We ﬁnd this to
be the case. In short, the overall evidence strongly suggests that rating downgrades
will cause economic losses.
Our results complement the ﬁndings of two recent related papers. Kisgen (2006)
argues that the capital structure decisions of ﬁrms are aﬀected by the possibility of
future rating changes. He documents that ﬁrms with a higher probability of a rating
change tend to issue relatively less debt as opposed to equity. This is exactly what
one expects if rating changes impose costs on ﬁrms and managers try to decrease
the probability of these costs.3 Our results reinforce his ﬁndings by providing a new
channel to identify the feedback eﬀect using equity volatilities and our structural
credit risk framework. Vassalou and Xing (2003) implement Merton’s model using
equity prices on a sample of downgraded ﬁrms following a variant of the KMV (2002)
1In our model, due to the path-dependency introduced by the feedback and the rating assignment
policy, equity is basically a complex barrier option that cannot be priced analytically. We employ
Markov chain techniques based on state-discretization to get the price numerically.
2The transformed-data MLE method of Duan (1994) has been applied in credit risk analysis
by Ericsson and Reneby (2004a,b), Wong and Choi (2004) and Duan, Gauthier, Simonato, and
Zaanoun (2003). A unique feature of our model is that we need to deal with a vector-to-vector
transformation between our state variable vector and the observed sample, we cannot separate the
transformations in diﬀerent time periods. This is simply due to the use of a moving-average type
rating statistic.
3Kisgen (2006) motivates this observed capital structure behavior with discrete costs of rating
changes. We refer the reader to his work for a thorough review of various potential reasons for the
feedback eﬀect.
3methodology.4 While this is not the focus of their paper, they document that asset
volatilities of downgraded ﬁrms increase before downgrades and decrease afterwards.
Similarly, we ﬁnd the same hump-shaped pattern for asset volatilities when feedback
is ignored in estimation. Moreover we ﬁnd that this pattern disappears once we
take feedback into account in estimation. Vassalou and Xing (2003) interpret their
ﬁndings by attributing a disciplinary eﬀect to rating downgrades. However, our
results suggest that this phenomenon can simply be induced by the feedback eﬀect.
If the feedback eﬀect is ignored in the structural model, asset volatility will appear
to increase before downgrades and decrease afterwards even though the underlying
risk of the ﬁrm remains the same.
There are numerous studies examining the behavior of stock prices around rating
changes. In summary this literature uncovers a negative stock price reaction up to
and including the day of downgrade.5 This paper diﬀers from this line of work in var-
ious respects. First the focus is diﬀerent. While this literature is mainly concerned
with the informational role of rating agencies, the feedback eﬀect can be present
irrespectively of whether downgrades convey information to the market.6 Second,
we focus on equity volatilities instead of mean returns. Third, to our knowledge, we
are the ﬁrst to theoretically incorporate ratings into a structural credit risk model
and use this framework to identify the costs of downgrades.
This work also adds to the fast growing literature on structural credit risk models.
Most papers in this stream of literature investigate the ability of the contingent
claims approach to predict spreads on debt markets using balance sheet and equity
market information (see for instance Eom, Helwege, and J.Z. (2004), Huang and
Huang (2003) and Ericsson, Reneby, and Wang (2005)). In this paper we extend
the use of these models to a new ﬁeld of application. In particular, we ask whether
the structural credit risk framework is useful when one wants to learn about the
costs of downgrades. We use the credit risk model as a device that allows us to use
the information from equity markets in our investigation of the feedback eﬀect.
Knowing whether rating downgrades themselves push the company toward ﬁnan-
4In the context of Merton’s model, the KMV estimates are identical to maximum likelihood
estimates developed in Duan (1994). Unlike the MLE method, however, the KMV algorithm is
silent about the distributional properties of the estimates and thus ill-suited for statistical inference.
For more on this see Duan, Gauthier, and Simonato (2004).
5Goh and Ederington (1993) ﬁnd negative stock price changes in the period preceding down-
grades and on the days of downgrades for ﬁrms that has been downgraded because of the dete-
rioration of their ﬁnancial prospect. Goh and Ederington (1999) reach similar conclusions and
document that stock price reactions are stronger for downgrades from investment to junk grades
and between junk grades than for those within the investment grades. Holthausen and Leftwich
(1986) ﬁnd analogous results for downgrades and show signiﬁcant increases (decreases) in stock
prices for additions to the Standard and Poor’s Credit Watch List indicating potential upgrades
(downgrades).
6One can interpret the noise about the downgrade barrier in our credit risk model as a reduced
form representation of rating surprises. By varying the level of the uncertainty we investigate the
robustness of our results to diﬀerent informational assumptions.
4cial hardship is interesting from several perspectives. First, if rating downgrades do
imply real costs to the company, then these costs should be taken into account when
a decision is made on capital structure. Second, recently there has been a tendency
among regulators to use agency ratings more extensively in setting the risk capi-
tal of ﬁnancial institutions.7 If a feedback eﬀect exists, these reforms are likely to
strengthen the feedback eﬀect further. As this may increase the number of ﬁrms in
distress, this should not be ignored when discussing the costs and beneﬁts of reg-
ulatory reforms. Eﬀects of feedback can be particularly painful because there tend
to be more downgrades during recessions (for empirical evidence see Altman and
Saunders (2001)). Thus, regulatory reforms may have an unintended procyclical
consequence.
The paper proceeds as follows. Before we turn to our model, Section 2 outlines
the basic intuition behind the results using an illustrative example. In Section 3
we present our structural credit risk model with credit ratings and feedback due to
rating changes. Section 4 shows the likelihood function for the model using time
series of equity and ratings data. Section 5 runs a Monte-Carlo exercise examining
sample selection and the performance of a test investigating the null hypothesis of
no feedback. In Section 6 we estimate the model on real data and ﬁnd support for
the existence of the feedback eﬀect. Appendix A contains details of our Markov
chain implementation used to price equity and Appendix B presents the derivation
of the likelihood function.
2 An illustrative example
Before we build and estimate a structural credit risk model rich enough to be taken
to real data, we illustrate in this section the basic insight of the paper using a
simple example. In particular we show that feedback losses push up equity volatility
before downgrades. Our structural credit risk model in essence uses this extra equity
volatility to identify feedback losses. We also show that if one tries to back out asset
volatility ignoring the feedback eﬀect, one ﬁnds an apparently increasing volatility
trend before downgrades even when the true asset volatility does not change. After
the downgrade these eﬀects disappear.
The framework we use to illustrate these ideas is the canonical model of Black
and Scholes (1973). Under the pricing measure, the asset value free of ﬁnancial
costs, Vt, is assumed to follow a geometric brownian motion with a drift equal to
the riskfree rate r.
dVt
Vt
= rdt + σdW
To model ratings, we assume that there are 2 rating categories, investment and
7A recent example of this is the Basel II framework for capital adequacy of internationally active
banks (see BIS (2004)).
5speculative. The company is downgraded to speculative the ﬁrst time its asset value
drops below a downgrade barrier cd. Once the company gets into the junk category
it is assumed to stay there forever. To model feedback losses, we assume that if the
ﬁrm is downgraded, a fraction J of the asset value is lost. We also assume that the
company has debt with face value of F maturing at T. Denote the running minimum
of Vt by Kt = mins≤t Vs. The payoﬀ of the equity at T, ST, can be written as
ST = 1KT>cd max(VT − F,0) + 1KT≤cd max(VT(1 − J) − F,0)
Thus equity is the sum of two barrier options on the ﬁrm value, a down-and-out call
and a down-and-in call. Importantly, because of the feedback eﬀect, the terms of
the two options are not identical. In our simple setup, standard results can be used
to price these options in closed form,(see Rubinstein and Reiner (1991)). Denote
the resulting equity pricing function by sFB
S = sFB(V ;σ,r,T,F,cd)
The upper panel of Figure 1 depicts equity values as a function of the asset
value for a case with and without feedback. The parameters used to generate the
graph are σ = 0.15,r = 0.05,T = 5,F = 1,cd = 1. The case J = 0 is the case
without feedback, i.e. the original Merton model. The case J = 0.1 is the case
when downgrades have real eﬀects. One can see on the graph that when the asset
value is high, the equity values in the two cases are virtually identical. This is
the consequence of the fact that the probability of a downgrade is practically 0.
However, as the asset value gets closer to the downgrade barrier cd, the two lines
begin to diverge. Thus, the equity function is steeper when J = 0.1. The reason
for this is that in the presence of feedback, a downward move in the asset value
has the secondary eﬀect of increasing the probability of a downgrade and hence of
a feedback loss. Once the asset value gets below the downgrade barrier, this extra
eﬀect disappears and the equity function becomes ﬂatter.
A straightforward application of Ito’s lemma provides the following expression
for the instantaneous volatility of equity σS = ∂sFB
∂V
V
S σ. From this expression it
becomes clear that the feedback eﬀect increases the instantaneous equity volatility
through two channels. First, by increasing the sensitivity of the equity price to the
asset value and thus increasing the delta of equity, ∂sFB
∂V . Second, it decreases the
equity value, S. The middle panel of Figure 1 shows the resulting equity volatilities
for the cases with and without feedback. One can see that when J = 0, equity
volatility increases smoothly as the asset value decreases showing the well-known
leverage eﬀect. When J = 0.1, the situation is drastically diﬀerent. Feedback
losses push up equity volatility, and the closer the company gets to downgrade, the
bigger this increase becomes. Also, there is a downward jump in equity volatility
at downgrade. The reason for this is that downgrade is not an uncertain event any
more, thus an important source of equity volatility is switched oﬀ. In our example
6the introduction of a 10 % feedback loss doubles equity volatility for asset values
close to the downgrade boundary.
The bottom panel of Figure 1 indicates what is likely to happen if feedback is
present but is not properly taken into account. The asset volatility is backed out
from the equity value and the equity volatility using the method of Jones, Mason,
and Rosenfeld (1984) and Ronn and Verma (1986). This consists of solving the two
nonlinear equations connecting the asset value and the asset volatility to the equity
value and the equity volatility.8 The model used to back out the asset volatility
ignores feedback in both cases. When J = 0, the theoretical model employed is
the correct one, therefore we get back the real asset volatility, σ = 0.15. However
when J = 0.1, the model we use to obtain the asset volatility is wrong. As it
omits the feedback eﬀect, it shifts all the extra equity volatility due to feedback
into the asset volatility before downgrades. This explains the increasing pattern of
asset volatilities before downgrades. Again, one can observe dramatic consequences.
When the asset value is close to the downgrade barrier, ignoring feedback leads to
the illusion of an asset volatility that is more than three times bigger than the true
value. One can also see that the model misspeciﬁcation disappears once the asset
value gets below the downgrade barrier. This happens because after the downgrade,
equity becomes a simple call option and the equity pricing function used to back
out the asset value becomes the right one.
While the example described above tells the basic intuition behind our results, it
is too simple to analyze real ratings and equity data. In particular one needs to take
into account two features of credit ratings. First, agencies base their decisions on
longer horizon averages of ﬁnancial variables, not simply on the last realized value.
Second, the rating policy is not completely transparent to the market, so one needs
to allow for some noise surrounding the rating assignment process. In addition, the
illustrative model sidesteps an important theoretical issue related to the risk-neutral
asset value dynamics. In particular, as the asset value is assumed to be a traded
asset, in the presence of feedback the risk-neutral dynamics of the asset value prior
to the downgrade should reﬂect the loss-potential. In other words, the risk-neutral
drift should be greater than r to compensate for the possibility of losses due to
downgrade. In the following section we introduce a discrete-time model accounting
for all of these issues.
3 The Model
This section outlines our model and the pricing theory. In this paper we concentrate
on the real eﬀects of credit rating downgrades, thus we try to keep everything else
standard. We set up a structural credit risk model in the tradition of Merton (1974)
8This procedure is valid in this illustrative example because we assume that the equity volatility
is known. In practice, one of course does not observe instantaneous equity volatility thus the method
is not valid any more.
7where default happens when the value of the company falls below its debt at some
future time point. The novelty of the model is that we also introduce credit ratings
into the structural framework. In the model, credit ratings are determined by the
ﬁnancial situation of the company through a rating assignment mechanism that we
will postulate later. However, as our focus is on the real eﬀects of rating changes,
ratings are not merely summary statistics of the ﬁnancial health of the company,
they are allowed to feed back onto it. A downgrade may for instance force asset
sales at knocked-down prices.
Our ﬁrst state variable, Vt, is the fundamental value of the ﬁrm at t. While
the fundamental value is not traded before T, equity, a contingent claim on the
fundamental value is assumed to be traded. At T the company is liquidated for VT.
One can think of our ﬁrm as one which reinvests all of its earnings up to T.9
We want to formalize the link between the asset value of the company and credit
rating changes. Thus, we also need to model how credit ratings are assigned. To do
this we introduce two other state variables. Let the rating of the ﬁrm at t, Rt, take
discrete values between 1,...,K, where K denotes the highest grade.
One can argue that ratings are partly determined by the ﬁnancial situation of the
ﬁrm, i.e., Vt. Thus the simple way to go about a rating assignment policy would be
to link ratings to the current value of the fundamental value process, Vt. However,
rating agencies typically base their decisions on longer term averages of the ﬁrm’s
performance. To implement our model on real data, we need to allow for this fact.
Thus we introduce a new state variable, a rating statistic Mt that summarizes the
history of the fundamental asset value process. One can for example think of Mt as
a moving average of past Vt’s.
Thus, at t < T the state of our system is determined by three variables: Vt,Rt
and Mt. In the following we specify how the system moves from t to t + 1.
Moving forward from t to t + 1, the ﬁrst variable to be determined is the new
rating Rt+1. At this stage, all we need to assume is that it depends on the past value
of the rating statistics, Mt, the past rating Rt and some rating noise, ξt+1 which
accounts for the uncertainty surrounding the rating assignment process. Using a
function g(.) to denote the rating assignment mechanism, we have
Rt+1 = g(Mt,Rt,ξt+1) (1)
Having determined the new value of the rating, we can specify the new funda-
mental value, Vt+1. This depends both on an exogenous shock to the fundamental
value process εt+1 and on the rating history. In particular we assume the following
relationship
Vt+1 = Vteµ− σ2
2 +σεt+1(1 − J(Rt,Rt+1)) (2)
9One simple way to interpret Vt, is to assume that at T, the company can be liquidated at some
known earnings multiple m. Then, Vt can be deﬁned as Vt = Etm where Et is the earning of the
company at t. Then, Vt directly corresponds to the earnings of the company at t, and at T, the
company is liquidated for VT = ETm.
8The ﬁrst part of the innovation, due to εt+1, can be interpreted as the change to
the real business prospect of the company. This part is standard and a similar
assumption is used, for instance, in Goldstein, Ju, and Leland (2001). The second
part, (1−J(Rt,Rt+1)), models the feedback from rating changes to the fundamental
value process. We assume a jump that is proportional to the fundamental value and
depends on ratings at t and t + 1. The percentage feedback loss is J(Rt,Rt+1).
The introduction of feedback is new to the literature dealing with structural credit
risk models and purports to model real eﬀects of rating changes. A downgrade,
for instance, may make the ﬁnancing of a company more expensive because it may
harden liquidity constraints or it may force the company to sell assets at knocked-
down prices.
The rating statistic Mt+1 is determined by its past value Mt and the new cashﬂow
Vt+1
Mt+1 = f(Vt+1,Mt) (3)
The speciﬁc recursive relationship will be stated later. To ﬁx intuition one can for
now think of Mt+1 as a moving-average type statistic.
The bankruptcy procedure is similar to Merton (1974). The ﬁrm is alive until
some time T, when it is liquidated as an all-equity ﬁrm for VT. The ﬁrm has debt
maturing at T with a face value of F. Given limited liability, the payoﬀ at T to the
equity holders is max(VT − F,0).
We assume that the continuously compounded risk free interest rate is r. εt+1
and ξt+1 are assumed to be standard normal variables, independent of each other and
across time. Let Ft denote the information set up to t; that is Ft = σ(V0,M0,εs,ξs,0 <
s ≤ t).
To price contingent claims in the model, assume that the logarithm of the
stochastic discount factor (SDF) and the innovation process (εt+1,ξt+1) follow a
joint multivariate normal distribution conditional on Ft. Following Lemmas A.1
and A.2 in the proof of Theorem 2.1 of Duan (1995), one can show that under this
restriction on the innovations and the SDF, the change of measure will induce a lo-
cation shift in the innovation process, equal to the risk premia. Assuming constant
risk premia, we have that under the pricing measure Q
Rt+1 = g(Mt,Rt,ξ∗
t+1 − λR) (4)




t+1 + ln((1 − J(Rt,Rt+1))) (5)
where ε∗
t+1 and ξ∗
t+1 are standard normal variables under Q and they are independent
of each other and across time. λV and λR are the corresponding risk premia. Since
Vt is not a traded asset, one cannot do away with λV , a result that is less speciﬁc
than Duan (1995).10
10Lemma A.2, item (b) in the proof of Theorem 2.1 in Duan (1995) is not applicable in our case.
9As usual, the price of the equity at t, St, is its conditional average payoﬀ under
Q discounted by the riskfree rate
St = e−r(T−t)E
Q
t [max(VT − F,0)] (6)
In general (6) cannot be computed in closed form as the rating feedback in (5)
introduces a complex path dependence to the system. Numerical methods need to
be used to compute the equity price.
When the feedback eﬀect is switched oﬀ, the model reduces to a discrete time
version of Merton’s model with a nontraded asset and (6) can be expressed in a
closed form. In particular it is given by
St = BS(Vte−(r−µ+λV σ)(T−t),σ,T − t,r,F) (7)
where BS(.) denotes the Black and Scholes (1973) call option formula.
If Vt were a tradeable asset value process, then by the results of Duan (1995) we
have the equality: µ − λV σ = r. Thus the pricing of equity would be identical to
Merton (1974); that is, St = BS(Vt,σ,T − t,r,F).
4 Maximum likelihood estimation of the model using
equity and ratings data
In general we are interested in estimating the ratings model described above given
a time series of equity prices and ratings data. To do this we use the maximum
likelihood (ML) transformed data method of Duan (1994). By this method, the
likelihood of the observation vector is equal to the likelihood of the implied state
vector using the theoretical model multiplied by a Jacobian term that takes into
account the transformation.
We ﬁrst study estimation of Merton’s model using an equity time series when the
asset value, Vt is not traded. We show that while the asset drift, µ is not identiﬁed, all
the other parameters can be estimated via working with a transformed asset value,
denoted by Ht. This does not entail any loss of generality as the asset value is not
directly observed anyway. Then, we argue that specifying the rating statistic, Mt
in terms of Ht has a nice economic interpretation and simpliﬁes estimation because
we do not need to worry about the nuisance parameter µ. We continue by choosing
a speciﬁc rating assignment rule and make some further simplifying assumptions to
prepare for the implementation of the structural credit risk model with feedback.
We complete the section by presenting the likelihood function.
4.1 Estimation in Merton’s model with nontraded asset values and
equity observations
When one tries to estimate Merton’s model with equity observations, the asset drift
is not identiﬁed if the asset value is not traded. Fortunately, all the other parameters
can be estimated after a suitable change of variables.
10Assume that we have a time series of equity observations {St,t = 0,...,N}
generated by Merton’s model with a nontraded asset value. Then we have a simple
version of our model without feedback. That is, the evolution of the logarithmic
asset value, lnVt, under the physical measure is




and the equity price can be written as
St = BS(Vte−(r−µ+λV σ)(T−t),σ,T − t,r,F) (8)
where BS(.) denotes the Black and Scholes (1973) call option formula. Thus, the
unknown parameter vector is (µ,λV ,σ). In the following we show that while µ is not
identiﬁed given the equity time series, the other two parameters can be estimated.
Introduce the new variable
Ht = e−r(T−t)E
Q
t [VT] = Vte−(r−µ+λV σ)(T−t) (9)
Note that Ht would be equal to the value of the ﬁrm at t if the assets were traded.
We can rewrite our system in terms of Ht instead of Vt.11
The dynamics of lnHt under P is




and the observed equity price can be related to the state variable Ht by
St = BS(Ht,σ,T − t,r,F) (11)
This implies that the likelihood of the observed equity sample does not depend
on µ. The reason is that neither the transformation in (11), nor the dynamics
in (10) depends on µ. Thus µ is unidentiﬁed but one can proceed with the ML
estimation of the system in (10) and (11) to get estimates of (λV ,σ). After a simple
reparametrization this in eﬀect becomes identical to the estimation problem posed
by Duan (1994).
In the next subsection we describe what restriction we need to put on the def-
inition of the rating statistic Mt to ensure that the intuition from Merton’s model
carries over to our more complex model with feedback and rating observations.
11For the purposes of showing that µ is not identiﬁed one can use an arbitrary shift that contains
µ, e.g. Vte
µ(T−t). We make the speciﬁc choice of Ht, because it has a nice economic interpretation
and we later use it in our deﬁnition of the rating assignment policy.
114.2 Speciﬁcation of the ratings assignment policy
In the feedback model the estimation task is more involved than that for Merton’s
model. The reason for this is twofold. First, the probability of the observed ratings
may be inﬂuenced by µ even after we changed the state variable to Ht. Second,
if the ratings do depend on µ in the new representation, then the equity function
linking the state variable to the observed equity prices will also depend on µ through
the feedback eﬀect.
To exclude these two channels we assume that the rating agencies base their
decisions on the time series of Ht’s. This has a nice economic interpretation. In a
world with no feedback and if the value of the ﬁrm was traded, it would be equal to
Ht. In other words, Ht is the intrinsic value of the company. Thus, in our model,
rating agencies try to use past intrinsic values in setting ratings, but they ignore the
feedback eﬀect. We assume the following simple form for the determination of the
rating statistic Mt
lnMt+1 = (1 − α)lnMt + αlnHt+1 (12)
This mechanism allows for the fact that rating agencies base their decisions on longer
term average statistics of the ﬁnancial health of the company. The parameter α
measures the speed with which the agency incorporates new information into the
ratings. This rule translates into a rating statistic, Mt, that is an exponentially
weighted average of past values of Ht’s.
In the following we specify the rating assignment function in (1) and make some
further simplifying assumptions to prepare for the implementation of the model.
A1 There are two rating classes, interpreted as investment and junk grade. Let
two denote the investment grade category. The rating agency is assumed to





The parameter ρ controls the amount of noise in the rating assignment process.
A2 The analysis is restricted to investment-grade ﬁrms downgraded to junk, not
the other way around. In particular a ﬁrm gets downgraded when Lt+1 gets
below some cd. Once a ﬁrm is in the junk category, it stays there for-
ever. We ignore upgrades because the empirical literature has shown much
more signiﬁcant changes in asset prices around downgrades than around up-
grades.12 Further, we assume that there is a ﬁxed percentage feedback loss
to the fundamental asset value when the ﬁrm is downgraded to junk; that is,
J(Rt+1 = 1,Rt = 2) = J.
A3 The rating noise is diversiﬁable so that it does not entail a risk premium, that
is, λR = 0.
12See for instance Hull, Predescu, and White (2004) or Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwhich (1992).
124.3 Likelihood function
Now we are in the position to derive the likelihood function using the transformed
data method of Duan (1994). The unknown parameter vector is denoted by θ. Our
state variable vector consists of the time series of (lnHt,Rt) while our observation
vector is the time series of (St,Rt). The dynamics of our state variable Ht under
the real measure P is
lnHt+1 = lnHt + r + λV σ −
σ2
2
+ σεt+1 + ln((1 − J(Rt,Rt+1))) (14)
The ratings are set according to the rule described in the previous subsection, and
the rating statistics are written in the recursive form in (12).
Expanding the state variables from {lnHt,Rt} to {lnHt,lnMt,Rt} makes the
system Markovian and thus the observed equity price at t can be written as
St = s(lnHt,lnMt,Rt,θ) = e−(T−t)rE
Q
t [max(HT − F,0)] (15)
Under the pricing measure Q,




t+1 + ln((1 − J(Rt,Rt+1))) (16)
The rating statistic evolves according to (12) and the rating evolves according to
Rt+1 = g(Mt,Rt,ξ∗
t+1) (17)
In Appendix A, we present the numerical techniques to get the equity function
s(lnHt,lnMt,Rt,θ) and its derivatives with respect to lnHt and lnMt.
The transformed data method of Duan (1994) can be applied to obtain the
likelihood function of the observed sample {St,Rt,t = 1,...,N} given M0,lnH0 (see
Appendix B)
L(St,Rt,t = 1,...,N | lnH0,M0,θ)
= −1


















where at = ln(1 − J(Rt,Rt−1) + lnH∗
t−1 + r + σλCF − σ2
2 ; lnH∗
t is the time series
of lnHt implied by the equity sample at the parameter vector θ; and lnM∗
t are the
implied statistics aﬀecting the ratings. Note that the lnM∗
t ’s can be determined
from past lnH∗
t ’s. ∂St





















135 A Monte-Carlo study on a simulated sample of down-
graded ﬁrms
In the empirical application we use our ML estimator on a sample of ﬁrms that are
downgraded from investment grade to junk. Because the likelihood function in (18)
has not reﬂected the sample selection, it is important to check for systematic biases
in the parameter estimates. We conduct a Monte-Carlo study using a simulated
sample of downgraded ﬁrms.
We estimate the model ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm. The parameter vector we estimate is θ =
(σ,λV ,cd,J). All other parameters are treated as known. We constrain J to be
positive. Throughout the paper we use the Hessian of the loglikelihood function to
compute the sample information matrix.
To simulate data we choose values that are typical in our real sample of down-
graded ﬁrms. The only exception is the risk premium parameter λV because sample
selection makes its estimation unreliable. In simulation we simply set λV = 1/3.13
For the asset volatility and the downgrade barrier we choose σ = 0.15 and cd = 1
respectively. We repeat the exercise for several diﬀerent values of the feedback loss.
The values we investigate are J = (0,0.05,0.1). We have two reasons to do this.
First, this gives us a way to investigate the consequences of restricting J to be pos-
itive. Second, we can investigate the size and power of the one-sided t-test for the
null hypothesis that J is 0. We set the face value of the debt to 1, the maturity of
the debt to 5 years and the riskfree rate to r = 0.05. The rating parameters are
ρ = 0.05 and α = 1/252.
Similarly to the sample selection implicit in the real data, we simulate 252 days
of daily equity data with the last day of each path being the day of the downgrade.
We do this by beginning each path with H0 = 1.2,M0 = 1.2, choose the ones that
are downgraded between days 253 and 504 and store 252 days of data ending with
the day of the downgrade for each path. We keep 500 downgraded paths. Then, we
perform ML estimation for each path and compute asymptotic standard errors.
When J is relatively low, the estimate of J is at the lower boundary, 0, for a
signiﬁcant fraction of the sample. For these paths, inverting the full Hessian to get
the standard errors is inappropriate. Instead, we compute the standard errors for
σ,λV and cd using the corresponding 3 × 3 sub-Hessian matrix. These standard
errors are then used to compute the empirical coverage rates in Table 1. For J,
we compute the coverage rates conditional on having a positive estimate of J, i.e.
we drop the paths where J = 0 and compute the coverage rates relative to the
remaining sample. Table 1 provides the results of the Monte-Carlo exercise.
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the mean and median estimates are close to their
true values with the exception of the risk premium parameter, λV . This suggests
that while selecting a sample of downgraded ﬁrms introduces a downward bias to
13Combining this value with our other parameter choices the intrinsic value grows at a rate of 10
%; i.e. r + λV σ = 0.1.
14the estimate of the asset risk premium, none of the other parameters are aﬀected
by the sample selection.14 The nominal coverage rates for σ are close to their
theoretical values in all cases. For cd, the results are still fairly good, though there
seems to be some divergence from the theoretical predictions. For J, the quality
of inference depends crucially on the value of J used to generate the data. When
J = 0.1, empirical coverage rates are close to their theoretical values. However, as J
decreases, the quality of inference is getting worse. The intuition is that for smaller
values of J, the sampling distribution of J is truncated at 0. The more severe this
truncation becomes, the worse the standard asymptotic normal distribution fares as
an approximation to the sampling distribution.
Constraining J to be positive does not cause diﬃculties when we want to test
the null hypothesis that J = 0 against the alternative that J > 0. The reason is that
under the null hypothesis we know the asymptotic distribution of the constrained
estimates. In particular it is known to follow a mixture distribution with one half
of its mass on 0 and the other half on a normal truncated at 0 (see for instance
Gourieroux and Monfort (1995), Chapter 21). Thus testing our null amounts to a
standard one-tailed t-test. Table 2 presents the Monte-Carlo evidence on the size
and power of this test using the parameter values from before. In ﬁnite sample, the
test seems to overreject slightly and has very good power.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Data
To estimate our model we use a sample of US public ﬁrms with data on stock price,
balance sheet and rating history. We match the CRSP daily stock database with the
rating history data from Moodys and the balance sheet information from Compustat
between 1970-2004. As a result, we have 1733 ﬁrms in the matched database. A
ﬁrm is assumed to have a relevant observation at time t if
• We have the necessary Compustat data: By this we mean that the ﬁrm has at
least one nonnegative asset value record (Data44) and equity record (Data59)
with the asset value bigger than the equity, dated in calendar time with the
end day of the calendar quarter in the interval [-250,-20] days relative to day
t. If we have at least one such data point, we keep the last one in this interval.
• We have daily CRSP data on number of shares outstanding, stock price and
holding period return.
• The day is in the span of the ratings history in the Moody’s database. We use
only the broader scales: C, Ca, Caa, B, Ba, Baa, A, Aa and Aaa
14This result is consistent with Duan, Gauthier, Simonato, and Zaanoun (2003) where survivor-
ship bias only aﬀects the estimate of the asset drift.
15From this matched database, we choose a sample of ﬁrms downgraded from
investment to junk grade for estimation purposes. A given ﬁrm is included in the
sample if it has at least 504 observations in the 800 calendar days preceding the
downgrades and it was in investment grade throughout this period. Our ﬁnal sample
of downgraded ﬁrm consists of 168 ﬁrms.
To estimate our model we also need to identify values of the debt and equity
of the ﬁrm as well as the riskfree rate. To arrive at an estimate of the debt F for
each day, we follow Brockman and Turtle (2003) and set the debt to Assets-Equity
(Data44-Data59). We set the maturity of debt to 5 years. In reality the debt of
the company does not remain constant. To allow for this in our implementation,
we use quarterly ﬁgures from Compustat. On days when the debt ﬁgure value
changes, we get the equity value by computing the market capitalization of the
ﬁrm. Then we multiply this ﬁgure by the holding period returns to get the equity
values between debt ﬁgure changes. Thus, we have accounted for stock splits and
dividend distributions. 15 We use the 1-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate
series from the FED as the riskfree rate.
Table 3 presents some descriptive statistics of the downgraded sample. In terms
of the timing of the downgrades, our sample is between 1976 and 2004, with roughly
half of the downgrades before 2000.
6.2 Estimation results
To estimate the model for each ﬁrm in the downgraded sample, we use the 252
days up to and including the day of the downgrade. For each ﬁrm we estimate the
parameter vector θ = (σ,λV ,cd,J). Before we can implement the model, we need
to specify the initial value of the ratings statistics, M0, and the rating parameters:
ρ and α.
The initial value of the rating statistic M0 is obtained by estimating Merton’s
model using only equity observations one year prior to downgrade.16 This procedure
yields a time series of estimated asset values. We then simply take M0 to be the
average of these.
We present results for various values of the rating parameters to ascertain that
our results are not driven by ad-hoc assumptions.17 The sets we investigate are:
15Care needs to be taken on the days when the debt ﬁgure changes because we have artiﬁcial
jumps in the leverage of the company, unrelated to equity volatility. To avoid this confounding
eﬀect, we drop these days from the loglikelihood function.
16This is exactly the period preceding the sample period which is used to estimate the feedback
model.
17One could in principle treat the rating parameters as unknowns and try to estimate them.
However doing so is not practical. Unreported simulation evidence suggests that the ﬁrm-by-ﬁrm
estimation is hindered by the fact that there are too many parameters to estimate relative to
the data available. Some parameters could still potentially be estimated by pooling data across
ﬁrms. However this would involve a hierarchical optimization which would be computationally very
demanding.
16(ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252), (ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252) and (ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126). The results
turn out to be qualitatively the same across diﬀerent values of the rating parameters.
We are able to successfully optimize for 166 out of the 168 ﬁrms. Table 4 shows
cross-sectional statistics of the estimates. In Panel A, the mean loss due to feedback
is around 0.07, while the median is 0. This latter is due to the fact that we constrain
J to be nonnegative and roughly one half of our sample has a positive estimate of
feedback loss. To investigate the cross-sectional behavior of our estimates for the
ﬁrms where feedback is likely to matter, we also look at cross-sectional statistics in
the subsample with positive estimates of J. Table 5 shows that among the 77 ﬁrm
in this subgroup, the mean estimate of the feedback loss is 0.153 while the median
is 0.113.
There are two facts emerging from these results. First, there seems to be a fair
amount of cross-sectional variation in the parameter estimates, underlining the need
for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc approach that we choose. Second, the number of ﬁrms with a
signiﬁcantly positive J at the 5% level amounts roughly to one third of the observed
sample. This is much higher than what can be attributed to chance. More formally,
we can compute a z-statistic for the null hypothesis of no feedback in any of the 166
ﬁrm.18 This yields a z-statistics of z = 16.2, a highly signiﬁcant rejection.
Our results up to now point towards the existence of signiﬁcant feedback eﬀects
for a large number of ﬁrms. However one may argue that these estimates critically
depend on the exact speciﬁcation of the feedback model. In the following we try
to conduct more robust tests supportive of the feedback eﬀect. The basic rationale
behind these tests is that a hump-shaped pattern in estimated asset volatilities will
emerge if feedback is ignored. As described in Section 2, the intuition is that the
feedback loss due to downgrade makes the equity of a company approaching down-
grade riskier than the standard leverage eﬀect would suggest. Further, once the
uncertainty surrounding the downgrade is resolved, the extra risk ceases to aﬀect
equity prices. We test three implications of this reasoning. First, we check whether
estimated asset volatilities increase before downgrades if we ignore feedback. Still
ignoring feedback, we then investigate whether asset volatilities decrease once the
downgrade is known. We also check to see whether the hump-shaped pattern dis-
appears when feedback is accounted for in the year before downgrades. The third
implication being examined is asset volatility prediction. In particular if feedback ef-
fects matter, ignoring feedback losses leads to poor asset volatility estimates. Thus
asset volatility estimates with feedback should have better out-of-sample perfor-
mance. In all of the tests we concentrate on ﬁrms where feedback is likely to matter
based on the estimation of our structural credit risk model with feedback. In par-
18The z-statistic comes from the following argument: Denote the rejection index (0,1) for ﬁrm
i as Bi. Let us ﬁx signiﬁcance level p for all ﬁrms. Then, under the null hypothesis, every Bi is
distributed as a Bernoulli variable with parameter p. Assuming cross-sectional independence among














17ticular we conduct the tests on the subpopulation of ﬁrms with a positive estimate
of the feedback loss, J.
Our model reduces to Merton’s model when feedback is switched oﬀ. So we sim-
ply use Merton’s model to get asset volatility estimates when feedback is ignored.19
For each ﬁrm, we get three estimates at diﬀerent time points. For ﬁrm i, the asset
volatility estimate using Merton’s model one year prior to downgrade is denoted
by ˆ σ
(−1)
i . The corresponding estimates immediately before the downgrade and two
years after are denoted by ˆ σ
(0)
i and ˆ σ
(+2)
i respectively. We leave a gap of one year
after the downgrade to allow the uncertainty around the feedback to dissipate. The




We ﬁrst test whether asset volatilities increase before downgrades. To investigate
this hypothesis we take the ratio of the asset volatilities immediately before the







. If estimated volatilities increase,
this ratio should be higher than 1. The left column of Table 6 presents statistical
tests based on the cross-sectional means and medians. The cross-sectional mean of
the relative increase in the estimated volatility is about 30%, while the median is
around 10%. Both the t-test on the mean and the Wilcoxon signed rank test on the
median reject the null hypothesis of no increase of volatility. The right column of
the same table suggests that when feedback is taken into account there is no longer








), are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.
We now investigate whether asset volatilities subside after downgrades. To test
this hypothesis, we choose ﬁrms with two years of data available after the downgrade
that remained in the junk category throughout the sample period. There are 45,47
and 44 ﬁrms meeting these criteria, depending on the rating parameters chosen. Our







. Again, according to our reasoning, the ratio should
be greater than 1 when feedback is ignored. Table 7 suggests that real data conforms
to the prediction of our model. The left column shows cross sectional means and
medians signiﬁcantly greater than 1. In the right column, where feedback is taken
into account, the means and medians are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 1.
One may argue that higher levels of market volatility coincide with higher num-
bers of credit downgrades. In this case, by picking periods when ﬁrms are down-
graded, we also pick periods with increased levels of volatility. This could be an
alternative explanation to the hump-shaped volatility pattern exhibited by the data.
19When feedback is ignored ratings do not materially inﬂuence asset volatility estimates. In this
case we only use equity observations for estimation purposes.
20Ideally, we should also obtain estimates using the feedback model a year before the downgrade.
However this is not informative because one is unlikely to observe a rating change from investment
grade to junk in this sample period.
18To separate this from the feedback argument, we repeat our investigations of the
volatility patterns around downgrades by controlling for changes in market volatility.
In particular, instead of working with estimated asset volatilities for each ﬁrm, in
each period we normalize by the concurrent standard deviation of the continuously
compounded returns of the S&P 500 index. Tables 8 and 9 show that controlling
for market volatilities does not materially change our results. The volatilities of
downgraded ﬁrms increase relative to the market before downgrades and decrease
afterwards. As before, this pattern disappears once we control for feedback.
Our last test is to gauge the usefulness of our model in predicting asset volatil-
ities. In particular we ask ourselves how well estimates from the model with and
without feedback in the year preceding the downgrade predict future asset volatil-
ities. The predictors with and without feedback are ˆ σ
(FB,0)
i and ˆ σ
(0)
i respectively.
The quantity to be predicted is ˆ σ
(+2)
i . We look at two measures of forecasting per-
formance, absolute mean square errors and relative mean square errors.21 Table 10
shows that the feedback model comfortably outperforms Merton’s model based on
both criteria.
7 Conclusions
If rating downgrades cause real losses to downgraded companies, their eﬀect should
be reﬂected in equity price movements before downgrades. In particular we suggest
that the extra uncertainty due to the potential feedback from rating changes pushes
up equity volatility in the period before downgrades more than the standard leverage
eﬀect would suggest.
To formalize this link between equity prices and feedback losses, we build a
structural credit risk model by incorporating feedback to asset value from rating
changes. Also, we develop a maximum likelihood estimator for the model parameters
using equity and ratings time series data. Estimating the model on a sample of US
public ﬁrms downgraded from investment to junk grade, we ﬁnd support for the
existence of feedback eﬀects of rating downgrades. The mean loss due to downgrade
in our sample is around 7 % of the fundamental ﬁrm value. As a further support of
our model, we ﬁnd the predicted hump-shaped pattern of asset volatilities around
downgrades if feedback is ignored. Once we account for feedback, the hump-shaped
pattern disappears. Disentangling fundamental asset volatility from the transitory
extra risk due to feedback is also found to be important for forecasting purposes.
Asset volatility estimates taking feedback into account perform better at forecasting
asset volatility out-of-sample.
Overall, our results point towards the existence of a speciﬁc form of ﬁnancial
distress costs due to credit rating changes. Rating downgrades from investment to
21Given a prediction of asset volatility σ
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19junk grade seem to impose real costs on the downgraded companies. These costs
should be taken into account both in corporate ﬁnancial decisions and in designing
the regulatory framework governing ﬁnancial markets.
20Appendix A: Implementation of the equity pricing
function
Due to the feedback introduced by the rating downgrades, equity prices in the
model are not available in closed form. In this appendix we present Markov Chain
techniques to compute them. 22
We approximate our model with a Markov chain and compute the prices in the
resulting discrete system. If one chooses the node locations and the transition prob-
abilities in the chain appropriately, the resulting Markov chain will converge to the
original continuous-state system as the number of nodes goes to inﬁnity. For proofs
and further background on the Markov chain technique see Duan and Simonato
(2001). The equity price computed from the Markov chain will also converge to the
equity price implied by the theoretical model.
The state of our system at t is described by the the variables (Rt,lnHt,lnMt).
While the ratings, Rt are discrete in the original system, we need to discretize the
theoretical model in lnHt and lnMt.
In particular, assume that lnHt can take up the discrete values
(h1,...,hM)
and lnMt takes values in the set
(m1,...,mn)
For ﬁxed M and N our Markov chain has MN2 diﬀerent states. Let the MN2×1
vector qt denote the value of a contingent claim at t. I.e. a speciﬁc element of qt
corresponds to the value of the contingent claim in one state of the chain at t. Then,
assuming no intermediate payoﬀs, and denoting by P the MN2 × MN2 transition
probability matrix of the Markov chain under the pricing measure, Q, the usual
risk-neutral valuation formula takes the form of the following recursion
qt−1 = e−rPqt
22Of the two main candidates, Monte-Carlo and state discretization techniques we opt for the
latter for two reasons. First, when we maximize our likelihood function, we use the equity func-
tion deﬁned by the numerical technique within an optimizer. However, gradient based optimizers
assume that the function being optimized is continuous and smooth. To ensure this, we need to
have a numerical procedure for the computation of the equity prices that is smooth in the model
parameters. However in our model the equity is a complex barrier option. In turn, it is known that
Monte Carlo estimators of barrier options are not smooth due to the discontinuity introduced by
the barriers. Thus in our application, using Monte Carlo would lead to a non smooth likelihood
function. The second reason for the use of state discretization techniques is that these yield the
equity function not only in one point in the state space, but on a whole grid. In our application, for
a given call of the likelihood function, we need to evaluate the equity function at diﬀerent values
of the state variables, both because we need to invert this function from the observed equity to the
underlying asset values and because we have multiple equity observations in the sample. Using a
technique that provides values on a whole grid of the state space for given model parameters thus
allows us to cut back on the computation time.
21A naive implementation of the chain would involve specifying the whole transi-
tion probability matrix and then using this matrix for the backward calculation of
any claim. This would have two problematic numerical consequences. First, even
before starting the recursions, one would need to set up an MN2×MN2 transition
probability matrix which can be quite time-consuming. Second, rolling the system
one time step back would necessitate computations on the order of MN2 × MN2.
The numerical task however can be simpliﬁed by recognizing two speciﬁc features
of our system.
First, the current value of the rating statistic, lnMt, and the future value of the
ﬁnancial health of the company, lnHt+1, determine the future value of the rating
statistic lnMt+1 through the recursive relationship in (12). This means that for a
given current node (lnHt = hj,lnMt = mk,Rt = w) we only have M2 continuation
values instead of MN2. This is because conditional on the current state of the
system a future value of lnHt+1 pins downs the future value of lnMt+1. As a
consequence one time step back in the recursion only involves calculations on the
order of MN2×M2 instead of MN2×MN2 workload of the naive implementation.
Second, while the rating evolution does depend on the current value of lnMt,
conditional on the rating evolution, the transition of the system forward in inde-
pendent of it. In other words, the forward movement of the system is described
by the forward rating probabilities P(Rt+1 = v | Rt = w,lnMt = mk) and the
forward ﬁnancial health movement transition probabilities P(lnHt+1 = hi | lnHt =
hj,Rt+1 = v,Rt = w). We have 4N rating probabilities and MM4 ﬁnancial health
transition probabilities. The sum of these is orders of magnitude less than the
MN2 × MN2 that would be necessary for the naive transition probability matrix.
As a result of these simpliﬁcations the backward recursion in the chain can be
written as follows




P(Rt+1 = v | Rt = w,lnHt = hj,lnMt = mk) ×
M X
i=1
P(lnHt+1 = hi | lnHt = hj,Rt+1 = v,Rt = w)
qt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt = mk),Rt+1 = v)
Here lnMt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt = mk) is the rating statistic computed from the
recursive form in (12). The value qt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt =
mk),Rt+1 = v) is obtained by interpolating from values corresponding to the discrete
grid (m1,...,mn).
Now let us specify the algorithm described above. The ﬁrst question is how to
determine the node values for lnHt, (h1,...,hM) and lnMt, (m1,...,mn). To ensure
that the likelihood function is well-behaving, we need to keep the same grids for
22diﬀerent values of the parameter vector θ. This means that there is not much scope
to try to optimize the grids using knowledge of the parameter values. For lnHt we
simply set the grid to be uniform in [h,h]. For lnMt we merge a uniform grid of
n/2 between (m1,m1) with a a ﬁner inner grid of n/2 between (m2,m2). This latter
grid allows us to get better equity prices by producing a ﬁner mesh in regions of
lnMt around the potential downgrade barriers.
The downgrade probabilities are





Here and elsewhere in the paper ˜ Φ denotes a truncated version of the standard
normal distribution function whose density is triangular in each tail with probability
p in the tails, allowing to set very low transition probabilities to 0. With p low
enough, this speeds up the algorithm considerably without aﬀecting the results.
Throughout the paper we set: p = 10−5.
The transition probabilities P(lnHt+1 = hi | lnHt = hj,Rt+1 = v,Rt = w)
would depend on the past ratings in general. For computational simplicity instead
of dealing with the feedback eﬀect in the transition probability matrices, we deal
with them in the payoﬀ function. I.e. deﬁning lnH−
t+1 as the value before accounting
for the feedback we can deﬁne a unique transition probability matrix by P(lnH−
t+1 =
hi | lnHt = hj and then account for the rating changes in the payoﬀ q(lnH−
t+1 =
hi,lnMt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt = mk),Rt+1 = v,Rt = w).
To get the transition densities we assume a discretization of lnHt+1 into bins








t+1 = hi | lnHt = hj) = ˜ Φ
￿





ci−1 − (hj + r − σ2/2)
σ
￿
Due to our assumption that the junk state is absorbing, the equity value in the
junk state is equal to the no-feedback value which is a standard computation using
the transition probabilities and the payoﬀ at maturity.
To get the value in the investment grade at t we need the continuation value at
t + 1 in case of downgrade. We have that
qt+1(lnH−
t+1 = hi,lnMt+1(lnHt+1 = hi,lnMt = mk),Rt+1 = 1,Rt = 2)
= qt+1(lnHt+1 = hi + ln(1 − J),Rt+1 = 1)
where qt+1(lnHt+1 = hi + ln(1 − J),Rt+1 = 1) is computed by cubic interpolation
in lnHt+1 from the grid of available no-feedback values.
23Now all elements are known for rolling the system backwards. Matlab is used
for all the computations. Further, sparse matrices are used to speed up the compu-
tations.
The Markov Chain recursion for a given set of parameters θ provides us with
values of the equity for a grid of values (lnH,lnM) for each rating. To compute
the likelihood function we need to use this function to back out the implied lnH∗’s
from the observed equity and we need the derivatives of the function to compute
the Jacobian. To ensure a well-behaved likelihood function all of these need to be
smooth functions. To achieve this we ﬁt bidimensional interpolating cubic splines on
the grid of values obtained from the Markov chain and then consider the resulting
spline as the equity function.23 Inversion from the vector of observed equity prices
to the vector of implied H∗
t ’s is done by solving the system of nonlinear equations
deﬁned by the equity function using Newton’s method. The derivatives of the equity
function with respect to lnH and lnM are computed by diﬀerentiating the spline
analytically.
Using a separate chain for each equity observations in a given data sample would
be computationally prohibitive, so we use one chain for a given data sample. We
assume the same maturity of debt for all equity observations in a given sample.
We choose the length of time step in the Markov chain to be one month. For the
calculations in the paper we choose M = 200,N = 40. The time frequency of the
Markov Chain implementation is chosen to be 1 month throughout the paper.
Appendix B: Likelihood function
In our model the equity price St can be written as a function of the state of
the system, {lnHt,lnMt,Rt} at the model parameters, denoted here by θ. One can
write
St = s(lnHt,lnMt,Rt,θ,T − t,F,r)
For notational convenience we suppress these arguments from now on and work with
the notation
S = s(lnH,lnM,R,θ) (20)
Then, given the observation vector {St,Rt,t = 0,...,N}, M0 and the parameter
vector θ we can recursively deduce the vector {lnHt,t = 0,...,N}.
• At t = 0 we have to invert the relationship S0 = s(lnH,M0,θ) to get H0.
23We use tensor product splines. We ﬁnd that in the lnM direction extra care is needed in
the spline interpolation because of the sudden change in the function value around the downgrade
barrier. Thus we use shape-preserving splines in this direction.
24• For t > 0 {lnHt−1,lnMt−1} is already known. Then, conditional on Ft−1,
lnMt can be written as a function of lnHt, lnMt(lnH). Then, we have a one-
to-one mapping between lnHt and St if the composite function s(lnH,lnMt(lnH),θ)
is increasing in lnH.
Write the transformation after 0 in vector form
¯ S = ¯ s(ln ¯ H; ¯ R,θ)
where ¯ S = (S1,...,SN)′, ln ¯ H = (lnH1,...,lnHN)′, ¯ R = (R1,...,RN) and ¯ s is the
vector-valued transformation.24 Then, invertibility means that we can deﬁne the
inverse ¯ s−1 by
¯ S = ¯ s(¯ s−1(¯ S; ¯ R,θ); ¯ R,θ)
Further, for a given parameter vector θ, denote the implied log ﬁnancial health
variable by ln ¯ H∗
ln ¯ H∗ = ¯ s−1(¯ S; ¯ R,θ)
Then by the transformed data method the log likelihood function of the observed
sample can be written as
L(St,Rt,t = 1,...,N | lnH0,M0,θ) = L(¯ S, ¯ R;θ) = L∗(ln ¯ H∗, ¯ R;θ) + ln|detJ|
where L∗ is the loglikelihood of the theoretical model taken at ln ¯ H∗ and |detJ| is
the determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the transformation from ¯ S to ln ¯ H∗.
First, let us write out L∗(ln ¯ H∗, ¯ R;θ). Let lnM∗
t be the time series of statistic
aﬀecting the ratings which is implied by the time series lnH∗
t . The joint likelihood
of the ratings process and the lnH∗
t process can be written as





Here the one-step-ahead probabilities are
P(Rt,lnH∗
t | Ft−1;θ) = P(lnH∗
t | lnH∗
t−1,Rt,Rt−1;θ) × P(Rt | lnM∗
t−1,Rt−1;θ)















where at = ln(1−J(Rt,Rt−1)+lnH∗
t−1+r− σ2
2 +σλCF. Thus, the joint loglikelihood
function of the theoretical model can then be written as




















24We also implicitly condition on the initial values: lnH0 and lnM0. We suppress this for
notational convenience.





















Here the ﬁrst equality follows from the deﬁnition of the Jacobian, the second from
the fact that the Jacobian of an inverse function is the inverse of the Jacobian of the
function. The third equality follows from the fact that in our model the equity value
at t, St depends only on past values of lnHt. As a consequence the Jacobian matrix
is triangular. But the determinant of a triangular matrix is simply the product of
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28Figure 1: Illustrative example: Volatility behavior around downgrades due to feed-
back








































Asset volatilities backed out ignoring feedback
J=0
J=0.1
This ﬁgure presents the consequences of feedback loss on volatility behavior around down-
grades. In this illustrative example downgrade happens simply when the asset value falls
below a barrier cd. Working in the Black-Scholes model, in this case one can use stan-
dard analytical results to price equity. The parameters used to generate the plots are
σ = 0.15,cd = 1,F = 1,T = 5,r = 0.05. The upper panel shows equity prices, the middle
one instantaneous equity volatilities as a function of the asset value. The bottom panel
shows the asset volatilities that are computed from the equity value and the equity volatil-
ity ignoring the feedback loss. These are obtained by solving the two nonlinear equations
connecting the asset value and asset volatility to equity and equity volatility.
29Table 1: Monte Carlo Results on Samples of Downgraded Firms Simulated with
Diﬀerent Values of J
J = 0
σ λV cd J
True Parameters 0.15 1/3 1 0
Mean 0.1459 -0.9727 1.0099 0.0081
Median 0.1460 -0.9468 1.0091 0.0000
10 Percentile 0.1326 -2.2021 0.9865 0.0000
90 Percentile 0.1604 0.0264 1.0351 0.0268
50 % coverage 0.4960 0.2180 0.4980 0.4834
75 % coverage 0.7160 0.4340 0.7300 0.7014
95 % coverage 0.9060 0.7900 0.9180 0.8578
J = 0.05
σ λV cd J
True Parameters 0.15 1/3 1 0.05
Mean 0.1522 -0.9979 1.0034 0.0439
Median 0.1503 -0.9533 1.0040 0.0483
10 Percentile 0.1337 -2.0511 0.9709 0.0000
90 Percentile 0.1723 0.0151 1.0354 0.0698
50 % coverage 0.5380 0.2100 0.4720 0.6000
75 % coverage 0.7760 0.4160 0.7040 0.8273
95 % coverage 0.9440 0.7760 0.9300 0.9568
J = 0.1
σ λV cd J
True Parameters 0.15 1/3 1 0.1
Mean 0.1533 -1.0026 1.0015 0.0925
Median 0.1507 -0.9596 1.0041 0.0981
10 percentile 0.1347 -2.0662 0.9616 0.0629
90 percentile 0.1759 0.0134 1.0361 0.1158
50 % coverage 0.5100 0.2080 0.4660 0.5396
75 % coverage 0.7580 0.4180 0.6860 0.7809
95 % coverage 0.9440 0.7720 0.9120 0.9635
This table presents the results of a Monte Carlo experiment investigating the behavior of
our maximum likelihood estimator on samples of downgraded ﬁrms. The results are based
on 500 downgraded paths, each one with 252 days of data, ending with the day of
downgrade. The rating parameters are ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252. The maturity is set to 5 years.
The coverage rates are computed using asymptotic standard errors. For J, we drop the
cases when J = 0 and compute the coverage rates on the remaining samples. For σ,λV
and cd we use all 500 paths to compute the coverage rates but use the corresponding 3 × 3
information matrix to compute the standard errors when the estimate of J is 0.
30Table 2: Size and Power of the One-sided t-test on J
J Used for Simulation 0 0.05 0.1
Rejection rate at 5 % nominal size 0.0820 0.6400 0.8800
Rejection rate at 10 % nominal size 0.1120 0.7000 0.9200
This table presents the results of a Monte Carlo experiment investigating the size and
power of a one sided t-test, testing the null hypothesis of no feedback. The results are
based on 500 downgraded paths, each one with 252 days of data. The rating parameters
are ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc parameters are σ = 0.15,cd = 1,λV = 1/3. The
maturity is set to 5 years. The t-statistic is computed using asymptotic standard errors.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the downgraded sample
Variable Mean Std.Dev 10 Percentile 90 Percentile
Firm size (millions of $) 6653 14398 489 13385
Leverage 0.70 0.16 0.48 0.92
Equity volatility 0.47 0.23 0.25 0.75
Equity mean return -0.37 .71 -1.24 0.31
Firm size is deﬁned as Market Value of Equity+Total Liabilities, leverage as
Total Liabilities
Market Value of Equity+Total Liabilities. All values use the last available value before the
downgrades.
Equity volatility is the standard deviation of past daily log holding period returns, while
the mean equity return is the mean. Both are annualized and use 252 days of data ending
with the day of downgrade.
31Table 4: ML estimation results on the full sample of US public ﬁrms downgraded
from investment grade to junk
Panel A: ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.200 -0.87 1.24 0.071
Median 0.185 -0.80 1.10 0
10 percentile 0.056 -2.48 0.73 0
90 percentile 0.329 0.68 1.86 0.208
Number of ﬁrms with positive J: 77
Number of ﬁrms with J signiﬁcant at the 5% level: 54
Panel B: ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.202 -0.83 1.10 0.067
Median 0.186 -0.79 0.97 0
10 percentile 0.059 -2.38 0.64 0
90 percentile 0.341 1.63 0.20
Number of ﬁrms with positive J: 79
Number of ﬁrms with J signiﬁcant at the 5% level: 55
Panel C: ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.200 -0.85 1.18 0.066
Median 0.184 -0.81 1.06 0
10 percentile 0.057 -2.36 0.73 0
90 percentile 0.344 0.68 1.71 0.203
Number of ﬁrms with positive J: 76
Number of ﬁrms with J signiﬁcant at the 5% level: 59
This table presents results of ML estimation on the full sample of downgraded ﬁrms for
diﬀerent values of the rating parameters ρ,α. The results are for the 166 ﬁrms with
successful successful optimizations. The maturity is set to 5 years.
32Table 5: Estimation results for a subsample of US public ﬁrms downgraded from
investment grade to junk with a positive estimate of J
Panel A: ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 77
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.168 -1.23 1.24 0.153
Median 0.141 -1.12 1.03 0.113
10 percentile 0.033 -3.30 0.76 0.010
90 percentile 0.322 0.63 1.93 0.302
Panel B: ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 79
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.18 -1.20 1.07 0.142
Median 0.184 -1.11 0.91 0.108
10 percentile 0.04 -3.00 0.65 0.010
90 percentile 0.35 0.59 1.67 0.300
Panel C: ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 76
σ λV cd J
Mean 0.168 -1.28 1.21 0.144
Median 0.142 -1.26 1.01 0.112
10 percentile 0.039 -3.25 0.76 0.012
90 percentile 0.346 0.59 1.86 0.319
This table presents results of ML estimation on subsamples of downgraded ﬁrms with a
positive estimate of J for diﬀerent values of the ratings parameters ρ,α. The maturity is
set to 5 years.
















ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 77
Mean 1.28 1.03
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.00036) (0.589)
Median 1.09 0.87
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.0028) (0.56)
ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 79
Mean 1.29 1.06
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.00028) (0.33)
Median 1.11 0.94
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.0019) (0.91)
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 76
Mean 1.31 1.01
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.00017) (0.77)
Median 1.12 0.89
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.0013) (0.272)
This table presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics and tests on the behavior of
estimated asset volatilities before downgrades for various sets of the rating parameters
ρ,α. The p-values on the cross-sectional mean come from a t-test, while the p-values on
the cross-sectional medians are from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The maturity of debt is
set to 5 years. All the results are on the subsample of ﬁrms with a positive estimate of J.
















ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 45
Mean 1.34 1.04
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0038) (0.56)
Median 1.08 0.92
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.02) (0.81)
ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 47
Mean 1.34 1.07
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0027) (0.31)
Median 1.08 0.918
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.018) ( 0.67)
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 44
Mean 1.28 0.947
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.016) (0.48)
Median 1.01 0.84
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.17) (0.092)
This table presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics and tests on the behavior of
estimated asset volatilities after downgrades for various sets of the rating parameters ρ,α.
The p-values on the cross-sectional mean come from a t-test, while the p-values on the
cross-sectional medians are from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The maturity of debt is set
to 5 years. All the results are on the subsample of ﬁrms with a positive estimate of J.
35Table 8: How asset volatility estimates behave before downgrades after controlling
























ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 77
Mean 1.24 1.02
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0009) (0.76)
Median 1.09 0.86
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.0075) (0.144)
ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 79
Mean 1.25 1.04
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0006) (0.51)
Median 1.09 0.91
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.004) (0.30)
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 76
Mean 1.28 1.011
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.00022) (0.86)
Median 1.11 0.88
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.0014) (0.069)
This table presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics and tests on the behavior of
estimated asset volatilities before downgrades for various sets of the rating parameters
ρ,α. The tests control for changes in market volatility (ˆ σ
(0)
SP for instance is the standard
deviation of log returns of the S&P 500 in the year before downgrades). The p-values on
the cross-sectional mean come from a t-test, while the p-values on the cross-sectional
medians are from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The maturity of debt is set to 5 years. All
the results are on the subsample of ﬁrms with a positive estimate of J.

























ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 45
Mean 1.38 1.06
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0045) (0.45)
Median 1.04 0.88
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.04) (0.89)
ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 47
Mean 1.33 1.05
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.0072) (0.50)
Median 1.04 0.89
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.061) (0.94)
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 44
Mean 1.31 0.97
(p-value of H0 : Mean = 1) (0.015) (0.75)
Median 1.05 0.85
(p-value of H0 : Median = 1) (0.12 ) (0.132)
This table presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics and tests on the behavior of
estimated asset volatilities after downgrades for various sets of the rating parameters ρ,α.
Here we control for changes in the market volatility (ˆ σ
(0)
SP for instance is the standard
deviation of log returns of the S&P 500 in the year before downgrades). The p-values on
the cross-sectional mean come from a t-test, while the p-values on the cross-sectional
medians are from a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The maturity of debt is set to 5 years. All
the results are on the subsample of ﬁrms with a positive estimate of J.
37Table 10: Asset Volatility Prediction
Merton Model Feedback Model
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/252,N = 45
Absolute MSE 0.0226 0.0171
Relative MSE 0.67 0.234
ρ = 0.1,α = 1/252,N = 47
Absolute MSE 0.0221 0.0166
Relative MSE 0.668 0.254
ρ = 0.05,α = 1/126,N = 44
Absolute MSE 0.0229 0.0189
Relative MSE 0.649 0.243
This table investigates how well asset volatilities estimated with and without feedback in
the year preceding the downgrade predict asset volatility estimates in the year ending 2
years after the downgrade. The two criteria used are relative and absolute mean square
error (MSE). All the results are on the subsample of ﬁrms with a positive estimate of J.
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